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ABSTRACT
Rich in resources and small in population, Western Sahara, partially occupied
since 1975 by neighbouring Morocco, has a history shaped to a large extent
by its natural wealth. Indeed, sovereignty over the country’s phosphates
became a key claim of the pro-independence, anti-Spanish Saharawi
movement in the early 1970s. Yet I argue in this paper that, since the
beginning of the Moroccan colonial period, it is only recently that sovereignty
over these resources has re-emerged as a prominent demand of the Saharawi
resistance activists. My paper charts the long history of mostly non-violent
resistance in the Occupied Territories, the focus of which, since the Moroccan
occupation, has traditionally been on human rights and independence.
Drawing on theories of hegemony and everyday resistance, my paper
explores what has prompted the recent turn towards natural resources as a
demand of Saharawi pro-independence activists and asks what the wider
implications of these new resistance claims are.
KEYWORDS Western Sahara; natural resources; resistance; colonialism; oil
On 28 October 2013, US company Kosmos, Scottish Cairn Energy and the Mor-
occan Ofﬁce of Hydrocarbons and Mines (ONHYM) announced their joint
plans to drill for oil in ‘one of the last undrilled petroleum systems along
the Atlantic Margin’ (Maxted 2013). Simon Thomson, CEO of Cairn Energy
commented that his company’s share in the farm-in Agreement would build
on its existing ‘strategic presence’ in ‘Morocco’ (Thomson 2013). His key
mistake was that the block to be explored – Cap Boujdour Offshore – is not
in Morocco at all, but off the shores of Western Sahara, the last colony in Africa.
Rich in resources and small in population, Western Sahara, victim since
1975 of a brutal and illegal Moroccan occupation, has a history shaped to a
large extent by its immense resources. Indeed, natural resources have
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always been at the centre of the Western Sahara conﬂict, and were a key
demand of the anti-Spanish protestors in the early 1970s. Spain exploited
Western Sahara’s rich phosphate reserves and Morocco continues to proﬁt
from the country’s natural wealth. The latter is illegal since Morocco is not
recognised internationally as holding sovereignty over Western Sahara, and
indeed an occupying power cannot legally exploit the natural resources of
the occupied country without the consent of the indigenous people of that
country. I argue in this paper that it is only recently that sovereignty over
these resources has started to become a prominent demand of the Saharawi
activists resisting the Moroccan occupation. As I chart below, the Occupied
Territories have a long history of mostly non-violent resistance, but the
focus of the latter was, since the Moroccan invasion, traditionally on human
rights and independence. What, then, has prompted the recent turn
towards natural resources in the demands of the protestors and what are
the wider implications of this turn?
This article relies on 20 individual (recorded) interviews, several personal
conversations and communications and two discussion groups (one with
seven participants in Agadir on 22 April 2014, the other with six in Marrakesh
on 23 April 2014) with Saharawis conducted in occupied El Aaiún, Western
Sahara, in August 2014, Rabat, Marrakesh and Agadir, Morocco, in April to
May 2014, Zaragoza, Spain, in November 2014, and the Saharawi refugee
camps/state-in-exile in December 2015, as well as one telephone interview
with a Solidarity Activist (a founding member and ex-Chair of the Europe-
based solidarity group Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW)) and obser-
vation of a four-hour workshop on natural resources for 22 Saharawi activists
led by the Saharawi group Saharawi Campaign against the Plunder (SCAP), in
Boujdour camp, Algeria, December 2015. Since June 2015 I have been Chair of
WSRW and have volunteered with the organisation since 2009. Thus, the
article also draws, to some extent, on my personal experiences.
Interviewees were selected for the most part for their roles leading cam-
paigns against natural resource exploitation. However, the discussion
groups in Moroccan cities were with nationalist activists that did not necess-
arily have links to natural resource campaigns. Similarly, ﬁve interviews (with
Nguia Haouasi, Soukaina Yaya, Hassana Aalia, Fatan Abaali and Hayat Rguibi)
and one personal conversation (with Ali Salem Tamek) were conducted in
order to gain the views and experiences of activists working within the
wider Saharawi resistance in the Occupied Territories but not necessarily
with a primary focus on resources, and one, with the Deputy Representative
of the Saharawi state-in-exile to the UK, to ascertain the ofﬁcial perspective
of the POLISARIO. The study forms part of a wider Ph.D. project on gender
and resistance in Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea funded by the Univer-
sity of Leeds.
646 J. ALLAN
In the ﬁrst section of the article, I chart the emergence of the Saharawi pro-
independence movements in the face of Spanish colonial rule and how the
issue of natural resources exploitation was framed within the nationalist
struggle. Following this, I look brieﬂy at the Saharawi non-violent resistance
movement in the occupied part of Western Sahara post the Moroccan coloni-
sation, and why its demands went ‘underground’ at ﬁrst, then re-emerged to
focus on human rights, socio-economic grievances and independence.
Thirdly, I focus on the Gdeim Izik protest, when natural resource-related
demands came explicitly back on the scene. I then explore in more depth
why natural resource exploitation has only resurfaced as a demand
amongst civilian activists in recent years, before ﬁnally analysing the impli-
cations of this turn.
The Spanish colonial period and the discovery of petroleum
deposits
Today Western Sahara’s natural wealth is under Moroccan control, with King
Mohammed VI and members of the makhzan (Morocco’s pro-monarchy elite
class and state apparatus), in many cases, proﬁting personally from its extrac-
tion. Nevertheless, its economic exploitation can be traced back to Spanish
colonial times. The colonisation of Western Sahara was carried out by a few
Spanish imperialists and merchants, followed by a handful of small companies
and indeed, at ﬁrst, the Spanish colonial project was an exclusively commer-
cial one (Munene 2008, 91). The objective was to create a series of small, for-
tiﬁed settlements along the Sahara’s coast. The ﬁrst was built in what was to
be the colonial capital, Villa Cisneros, modern-day Dakhla, in 1884–1885 (San
Martín 2010, 26), and later buildings were erected in Tarfaya and Lagwirah in
1916 and 1920, respectively (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 100). The Spanish could
beneﬁt from Western Sahara’s rich ﬁsheries and trade with Saharawi tribes
and others travelling along the traditional caravan route from Senegal.1
Private geological expeditions concluded in 1947 followed by government-
commissioned surveys conducted between 1952 and 1962 found petroleum
deposits in several locations both on land and offshore. However, due to low
prices, low quality and lack of infrastructure, no companies invested (San
Martín 2010, 51). The discovery of the largest phosphate reserves on earth
(integral to producing agricultural fertilisers) was seen to be far more poten-
tially lucrative and thus the colonial project expanded inland. Spain’s state
mining company EMINSA (later FOSBUCRAA) built the Fos Bucraa mine in
1968, including a 60-mile-long conveyor belt (the longest of its kind in the
world) to transport the riches to the Atlantic ocean for export. Forty-six
years on, Morocco makes use of this mine to dominate the global phosphate
market with an 85% share. In 2014 alone, Fos Bucraa yielded an estimated 2.1
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million tonnes of phosphate with an estimated value of $230 million per
annum (Western Sahara Resource Watch 2015).
Although by the 1960s, the UN was pressuring Spain to decolonise,2 the
expansion of the colonial project brought more and more Spanish settlers
to Western Sahara, which was by then recognised as a Spanish province.
Much of the Saharawi population became sedentary. Many men worked at
the phosphate mine and men and women in the ﬁsheries industry, providing
a cheap labour force for resource exploitation, and others had jobs with the
colonial administration. However, this is not to say that the population was
not segregated. Indeed it was, and, unsurprisingly, the wealth of the territory
was unequally divided in favour of the Spanish. This dissatisfaction, combined
with the collapse of traditional forms of social organisation based on kinship,
allowed the emergence a new sense of collective identity. As a 1973 Spanish
population survey found, the Saharawis no longer identiﬁed themselves along
tribal lines. Instead, they joked that all Saharawis belonged to the low-caste
Znaga (tributary) tribe and paid tribute to the Spanish (San Martín 2010, 55).
Meanwhile, revolutionary fervour was spreading throughout the African
continent, and Western Sahara would not escape the trend. Mohammed
Bassiri, a Saharawi intellectual and moderate nationalist well versed in pan-
Arabism and the socialist, anti-colonial currents ﬂowing through Africa at
that time, fostered the spreading of such political discourses amongst the
Saharawi population. As the sense of a collective Saharawi identity and Bas-
siri’s brand of nationalism diffused throughout Western Sahara, the origins
of a pro-independence movement were sown. Nevertheless, following a
5000-strong Saharawi protest at Zemla Square, El Aaiún, 17 June 1970,
several movement leaders were imprisoned or shot, and Bassiri was disap-
peared. This violent repression of a peaceful movement pushed the Saharawi
nationalists towards armed struggle. Regarding these events, the Spanish
leaders of Franco’s Women’s Section in the Sahara were told by Saharawi
women, ‘[t]he historic moment was 17 June 1970. We can’t trust you any
more… ’ (Mateo 1974, 8). Shortly after the massacre and inspired by Zemla
and Bassiri’s group Harakat Tahrir, a group of young Saharawi university stu-
dents who had been studying in Morocco formed the Frente Por la Liberación
de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro (POLISARIO), led by the charismatic El Wali
Mustafa Said (commonly known as ‘El Wali’).
Thus, the armed struggle began. At ﬁrst, El Wali and his comrades travelled
under cover around the territory to recruit supporters whilst activists such as
Fatima Ghalia Leili began to train women in direct action methods (Interview
with Soukaina Yaya, Activist born in the Spanish period, El Aaiún, 22 August
2014). POLISARIO and its women’s wing the National Union of Saharawi
Women (UNMS) carried on the ideological work that Bassiri had begun. POLI-
SARIO nationalist ideology drew on revolutionary, socialist discourses that
emphasised the centrality of the role of the popular masses for revolutionary
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change and the principle that collective interests should always precede those
of the individual. POLISARIO envisaged an egalitarian, communal society, in
which slavery was abolished and the emancipation of women was an aim
(Allan 2010, 190). Saharawi nationalist discourses launched a reading of the
social that, following what Laclau and Mouffe have named ‘logic of equival-
ence’, attempted to divide the ﬁeld of discursivity into two opposing ideologi-
cal blocks able to deny each other while ‘decontesting’ andmaking equivalent
a whole series of more particular discourses, conﬂicts and grievances (1987).
The discrimination against Saharawi employees in the Fosbucraa mine, the
lack of access to educational and job opportunities for Saharawi women,
the barriers to political participation for the younger generations of Saharawis,
the racial discrimination suffered by black slaves and harratin (former slaves)
were all made equivalent and acquired their meaning as different expressions
of a single oppression: that of the colonialist foe – ﬁrst Spain then Morocco
and Mauritania later (Allan 2010, 190).
Under Spain, freedom from the colonial foe was expressed through POLI-
SARIO discourse as independence for the Saharawi people and sovereignty
over their natural resources. Spanish archives from the period indicate how,
by 1974, such discourses were becoming hegemonic amongst the Saharawi
population. A Spanish report on Saharawi women’s political views, for
example, found that women were almost without exception pro-indepen-
dence and pro-self-determination, opposed to integration with any other
country and supportive of the POLISARIO. Saharawi women were conscious
of being ‘rich people but the Spanish [were] taking what was theirs’ (Mateo
1974, 20) and the phrase ‘we are rich and we have phosphates’ (Mateo
1974, 3) was reportedly ‘repeatedly’ heard by the Spanish researchers. Two
events help to further illustrate how sovereignty over natural resources was
welded, in the emerging nationalist discourses, with the dream of
independence.
In October 1974, a 15-year-old Saharawi schoolgirl gathered together all
her female classmates to plan a break-time protest against the Spanish pres-
ence in the territory. The girls complained that the Spanish had done nothing
in the territory apart from ‘discovering phosphates’ and ‘taking them away’
(Mateo 1974, 9). On the 19th night of the same month, POLISARIO guerrillas
sabotaged two stations of the Fosbucraa conveyor belt, costing Spain ‘very
serious’ economic losses (Mateo 1974). Through the nationalist ideologies
they sowed and made hegemonic, the POLISARIO made the natural wealth
of the Western Sahara a key demand for Saharawi resistance against the
Spanish. We shall see later how this demand was to resurface amongst civi-
lian-led non-violent resistance during the Moroccan occupation.
Towards the end of 1974, under increasing pressure from the UN externally
and from the Saharawi movement internally, Spain announced its decision to
hold a self-determination referendum for the Saharawi people and conducted
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a census for that purpose. Nevertheless, Morocco and Mauritania had other
ideas, claiming Western Sahara as their own. The two countries took their
claim to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1975 with the support of
all Arab states, requesting an Advisory Opinion that would help consolidate
their planned takeover legally. However, the ICJ did not issue the opinion
that Morocco hoped for. Historical evidence did not ‘establish any tie of terri-
torial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom
of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity’ but did show that, in pre-colonial
times, the Moroccan Sultan had no control over Western Sahara and nor
did the sultanate claim that the territory was under its control (International
Court of Justice 1975). Thus, the ICJ urged the application of General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV) for ‘the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particu-
lar, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine
expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory’ (International Court of
Justice 1975).
The day after the ICJ ruling King Hassan II announced on Moroccan televi-
sion that the Court had ruled in his favour and that he would therefore lead a
‘peaceful’ Green March of over 300,000 Moroccan civilians into Western
Sahara. Spain, unwilling to face an unpopular and expensive war with
Morocco and Mauritania, and cowed by pressure from the US, conceded
through a tripartite agreement signed on 14 November 1975 to divide
Western Sahara between its two African neighbours. In exchange for selling
out its colony, Spain would have the right to a 35% share of any future
mineral exploitation as well as certain rights over ﬁsheries (Zunes and
Mundy 2010, Chapter 1).
In November 1975, 350,000 Moroccan civilians marched on foot towards
the cities of Western Sahara. Meanwhile, the Moroccan army entered with
tanks and aeroplanes. They bombed groups of ﬂeeing Saharawis (roughly
half the population remained in the region of Western Sahara that was to
become occupied) with napalm and white phosphorus (San Martín 2010, 2).
These civilians were heading on foot to Algeria, which had offered asylum
in its Hamada: the driest and most inhospitable part of its desert, where
the Saharawi refugees remain to this day. It was here that the POLISARIO
set up its state-in-exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
originally proclaimed in Bir Lehlou, in the liberated part of Western Sahara,
on 27 February 1976.
The Mauritanian forces were little match for the guerrilla tactics of the POLI-
SARIO. Mauritania retreated in 1979, signing a peace deal with the Saharawis,
by which time Morocco had been all but entirely driven out of the territory
(Mauritania has since recognised the SADR). However, unfortunately for the
POLISARIO, over the next decade the tide was turned by Morocco’s long-
term allies Saudi Arabia, France and the US, who offered ﬁnancial and military
backing and sponsorship for the world’s largest active military wall (Zunes and
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Mundy 2010, Chapter 1). Approximately 2700 km in length, the ‘Wall of
Shame’, as it is known by Saharawis, splits the POLISARIO-controlled and
Moroccan-occupied territories into two and is heavily fortiﬁed by mineﬁelds
(San Martín and Allan 2007). This put Morocco in a strong position for nego-
tiating once the UN moved back on the scene in an attempt to establish
a ceaseﬁre in 1991. The latter was predicated on the promise of a self-
determination referendum for the Saharawis. Yet the vote has been repeat-
edly blocked by Morocco, leaving the UN-sponsored solution to the conﬂict
in a quagmire. The POLISARIO, left without a realistic military option in the
face of Moroccan military superiority and its powerful western allies (this,
nevertheless, has not prevented growing calls for a return to war), has since
continued on the seemingly stagnant political path. Meanwhile, in the Occu-
pied Territories, a non-violent movement of Saharawi civilians has emerged,
whose resistance will be the focus of the next section of this article.
Non-violent resistance in occupied Western Sahara: human
rights, socio-economic grievances and independence
During the early 1980s, acts of resistance were largely clandestine. The open
calls for independence and sovereignty over natural resources that over-
whelmed the Spanish during their last 18 months in the territory were
simply not thinkable amidst the terror of the Moroccan occupation. Neverthe-
less, what James C. Scott might call a ‘hidden transcript’, conspicuous acts of
deﬁance against the occupation played out behind closed doors, thrived.
POLISARIO radio announcements were listened to beneath blankets to
mufﬂe the sound (Interview with Sultana Khaya, Activist and President of
the Saharawi League for Natural Resources and Human Rights (Saharawi
League) 26 November 2014), pro-POLISARIO leaﬂets were distributed in
secret and wanted activists were hidden in safe houses. The most daring
Saharawis organised what they called ‘operations’, which involved writing
Saharawi slogans and painting the SADR ﬂag on the walls of Moroccan admin-
istrative buildings and swapping Moroccan ﬂags for SADR ones (personal
communications with ex-disappeared Malainin Lakhal, October 2013).
James C. Scott’s argues that public, declared resistance (petitions, strikes,
demonstrations and so on) are mainly the preserve of western liberal democ-
racies, whilst communities that are unable to publically protest safely use
what Scott calls infrapolitics (hidden transcripts, everyday acts of resistance
and dissident subcultures, as was the case of the Saharawis in the early
1980s) (1990). Declared and open rebellion will only break out amongst
such an oppressed community, argues Scott, when ‘the pressure [of indigna-
tion] rises or when there are weaknesses in the “retaining wall” holding it back’
(1990, 197). Yet this explanation does not fully account for the case of Western
Sahara. In 1987, when Moroccan repression was at its height and
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disappearances of Saharawis were menacingly common, Saharawi activists
organised a major human rights protest in El Aaiún, when the UN was visiting
to begin preparing the referendum on the fate of territory. Such declared
resistance despite the inevitable violent repression that protesters must
have expected to face illustrates that the strategic need to perform resistance
to an external audience (and thereby further disseminate a counterhegemo-
nic discourse that challenged Moroccan hegemony) is also important in
explaining why resistance becomes open and public. Whilst, between the
Moroccan invasion and 1987, Saharawi civilians in the Occupied Territories
relied on the covert, hidden resistance tactics that Scott would call the
weapons of the weak, the UN visit presented a political opportunity that acti-
vists tried to capitalise on, launching, for the ﬁrst time under Moroccan colo-
nisation, an open and mass protest.
Dozens of organisers and participants in this 1987 protest were forcibly dis-
appeared, including Aminatou Haidar, one of the unofﬁcial leaders of the
resistance, who was imprisoned and tortured for four years. She and 299
other formerly disappeared Saharawis, including whole families in a few
cases – some of whom were detained post the 1987 protest and others
during the 1970s and earlier in the 80s, but all of whom had been kept incom-
municado and without trial –were released in 1991 coinciding with the cease-
ﬁre (US Department of State 2003).
The release of these political prisoners helped to inspire greater resistance
amongst a younger generation of Saharawis (Barca and Zunes 2009, 159). The
new presence of the UN in the territory also gave many activists renewed con-
ﬁdence to ‘go public’ in their acts of resistance, since they felt they now had
international eyes on them, in itself a form of protection (personal communi-
cation with Malainin Lakhal, 13 May 2014). Saharawi activists have since been
proved wrong. MINURSO, the UN mission to the territory is highly unusual in
that it is a peacekeeping mission with no mandate to monitor human rights.
Every April, the UN Security Council votes on the inclusion of human rights
monitoring in the MINURSO’s mandate, and every year France, Morocco’s
most loyal ally, uses the threat of veto to block this. As such, even when Sahar-
awis are publically beaten in the square in front of the UN building (which,
incidentally sports a Moroccan but not a Saharawi ﬂag outside), UN staff
look the other way. Some Saharawi protestors even report attempting to
seek refuge in the UN building only to be handed over to Moroccan police
by MINURSO staff (conversations with political activist Hamza Lakhal, El
Aaiún, August 2014).
The intifadas of the early 1990s (much smaller in terms of participation and
shorter in time than the better researched and documented intifadas of 1999
and 2005 but known as intifadas by Saharawis nonetheless), such as the Inti-
fada of Three Cities in Smara, Assa and El Aaiún in 1991, called for freedom for
political prisons, protested against the holding of Moroccan elections in
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Western Sahara and even demanded independence.3 Especially for this latter
demand, the uprisings were harshly oppressed, resulting in several forced dis-
appearances and decades-long prison sentences for participants. For this
reason, when the 1999 intifada burst onto the scene inspired by the release
of several Saharawi political prisoners viewed as heroes and the perceived
political opportunities following the death of Hassan II (Shelley 2004, 115),
demands were to focus on human, students’ and workers’ rights, leaving
the more dangerous demand of independence for the later 2005 intifada
(M. Lakhal, pers. comm., 13 May 2014) The latter saw explicitly nationalist pro-
tests across Western Sahara and the Saharawi-dominated areas of southern
Morocco, and incorporated all sectors of the population, from school children
to old women and men (Stephan and Mundy 2006).
A dark cloud over the Saharawi struggle: commercial quantities
of oil?
As illustrated throughout this article, Western Sahara’s natural resources have
been exploited by its colonisers since the end of the nineteenth century. The
expense of maintaining its occupation of Western Sahara has been made
worthwhile by Morocco’s ability to sell the ﬁsh, agricultural produce, phos-
phates, salt, sand, wind and solar energy of its colony. For example, all off-
shore ﬁshing is by Moroccan-owned trawlers, and of the traditional inshore
ﬁshing, very few licenses are granted to Saharawis (All-Party Parliamentary
Group onWestern Sahara 2014). In Dakhla, where ﬁshing is the major industry,
only 5% of workers are Saharawi. The phosphate industry currently employs
around 3000 workers, amongst which only 21% are Saharawi (All-Party Parlia-
mentary Group on Western Sahara 2014). The latter tend to be employed in
the lowest paid jobs such as cleaning (Personal interview with Sidi Breika,
POLISARIO Deputy Representative to the UK, London, 31 March 2014) and
indeed fewer than 4% of technicians are Saharawi. All tomato farms are
owned by the Moroccan Royal Family, powerful Moroccan conglomerates
or by French multinational ﬁrms. None are owned by Saharawis, or indeed
by small-scale Moroccan settlers (All-Party Parliamentary Group on Western
Sahara 2014). Looking East, the 165,000 Saharawi refugees living on humani-
tarian aid in the camps in Algeria receive no compensation from the exploita-
tion of their natural resources (UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
2015).
The potential exploitation of the petroleum deposits ﬁrst discovered by the
Spanish in the 1940s and 1950s is now looming over the desert territory. It is
the economic proﬁt on Morocco’s part that darkens the horizon for Saharawi
aspirations of independence. The beginning of oil exploration contracts could
be about to dramatically swell that proﬁt. Morocco’s illegal oil and gas pro-
grammes currently consist of six blocks in the waters of Western Sahara,
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each issued to companies by ONHYM (Western Sahara Resource Watch 2013,
4). Two British companies, Teredo Oil Limited and Cairn Energy, hold shares in
the Boujdour Offshore Shallow Block and the Cap Boujdour Offshore Block,
respectively (Western Sahara Resource Watch 2013, 4), whilst Irish/British
San Leon began drilling onshore, near El Aaiún city, in March 2015. Cairn
Energy, with its partner Kosmos, moved their rig to begin drilling the one
billion barrel potential Gargaa Prospect in their block in December 2014.
Nevertheless, the signing of the oil and gas agreements coincides with a
new phase in Saharawi resistance. The demand that was so prominent
under the Spanish, sovereignty over natural resources, is emerging once
again, as is discussed in the next section.
The Gdeim Izik Intifada: ‘The Saharawi people suffer whilst its
wealth is looted’4
The Gdeim Izik protest of 2010 has been described by Noam Chomsky as the
beginning of the Arab Spring. ‘[T]he greatest demonstration carried out by
Saharawis’ (Breika, pers. int., 31 March 2014) saw 15,000–20,000 create a
tent city in the desert of the outskirts of El Aaiún. As Wilson highlights
(2013, 91), if we take as a guide the latest available UN estimates for the
total Saharawi adult population in the Occupied Territories in 2000, which
was 41,150, the huge scale of the protest in proportional terms is better
appreciated (although the UN ﬁgure is a conservative estimate). Also as
Wilson points out, the Gdeim Izik protest took place in the temporal, geo-
graphical and conceptual margins of the Arab Spring (2013, 82). Its highly
organised nature (the camp acted as a fully functioning society, complete
with regular rubbish collections, medical surgeries, committees for nego-
tiation with the Moroccan authorities and the distribution of food, water
and other essentials) illustrates that the Saharawis are ‘able to survive and
organise themselves without any need for the Moroccan colonial adminis-
tration’ (Lakhal 2014, pers. comm.). As Mundy argues, its desert camp
format was also meant to show solidarity with the Saharawi refugees of
Algeria (2011).
Says one of the administrators of the camp, ‘the main objective was,
amongst other things, to stop the massive exploitation of Western Sahara’s
resources’ (Activist interviewed in Sahara Thawra 2012). Hassana Aalia, who
has been sentenced, in absentia, to life imprisonment for allegedly organising
the camp,5 sees natural resource exploitation as a principal reason for the
emergence of the latter: ‘the multinationals and the European Union are
still robbing our natural resources, whilst the Saharawi population is poorer
and poorer, and suffering increasing unemployment’ (Personal interview
with Aalia, Zaragoza, 26 November 2014). Aalia’s colleague Nguia Elhaouasi,
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currently serving a suspended sentence for her alleged role in the camp,
agrees:
The Gdeim Izik camp came about following so much pressure against the Sahar-
awi population. We have no right to work. There are many graduates, some even
have a doctorate, but none of them can get a job. And we don’t beneﬁt from our
natural resources: the ﬁsheries, the phosphates… So under so much pressure,
and without a right to our resources, the camp exploded. (Personal interview
with Nguia Elhaouasi, Zaragoza, 26 November 2014)
Indeed, common slogans chanted at the encampment included, as quoted
above, ‘the Saharawi people suffer whilst its wealth is looted’, and ‘our
resources, we don’t see them, they don’t see us’ (Breika, pers. int., 31 March
2014). Said another activist who lived at the camp, ‘Gdeim Izik was concerned
with social and political issues, and the natural resources of the Sahara,
because Saharawi people are not for proﬁt’ (Personal interview with Fatan
Abaali, Agadir, 22 April 2014).6 Indeed, when Saharawis comment on the
activities of oil companies and others in their territory, they most often link
their complaints to the socio-economic situation of their people. Explains
one activist,
we focus on natural resources more than anything because there are a lot of
jobless Saharawis. They see their ﬁsh, their sand, going to other countries and
they get nothing from it. Their territory is not poor. It is rich. But Saharawis
cannot even afford a few coins for coffee or cigarettes. (Personal interview
with Ahmed Baba, Rabat, 28 April 2014)
When they heard, on 8 November 2010, that Moroccan security forces had
surrounded Gdeim Izik and were proceeding to raze it to the ground, Sahar-
awi activists in El Aaiún set ﬁre to the premises of the Moroccan Ministry of
Mines and Energy, which houses ONHYM (Western Sahara Resource Watch
2013, 9). Subsequently, and to this day, Saharawi activists living across occu-
pied Western Sahara, and Saharawi students living in Morocco proper, organ-
ise regular demonstrations against the oil companies that have signed
agreements with OHNYM. It is worth pointing out that much of these protests
are dominated by women. Practising politics, in the wide sense of the word, is
constructed as a feminine as much as a masculine role in Saharawi culture,
whilst Saharawi women’s constructed role as mothers and homemakers
allows them some ﬂexibility with regard to the time and space to take part
in demonstrations. On the other hand, men, due to their constructed mascu-
line role as breadwinners, sometimes opt to avoid public forms of protest for
fear of losing their jobs. Returning to forms of protest against natural resource
exploitation, hunger strikes against the oil industry have also been reported
(Western Sahara Resource Watch 2013, 9), and YouTube video testimonies
in which Saharawi women and men denounce individual oil companies in
Arabic, English and Spanish are common.7
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Saharawi activists have, in recent years, begun to set up organisations
focused primarily on ﬁghting the exploitation of natural resources such as
oil by foreign players. The ﬁrst of these was the Committee for the Protection
of Natural Resources in Western Sahara (CSPRON) founded in 2006 in El Aaiún
(Personal Communication with Lahcen Dalil, Vice President of CSPRON, 18
December 2014), followed by the Saharawi League for Human Rights and
Natural Resources (Saharawi League) in 2011, Boujdour (S. Khaya, pers. int.,
26 November 2014) and the Association for the Monitoring of the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection of Western Sahara, El Aaiún, 2015
(personal communication with the founders, 25 April 2015). Other Saharawi
organisations such as the Saharawi Centre for Media and Communications,
the Collective of Saharawi Defenders of Human Rights (CODESA) and
Equipe Media that have, in the past, had a wider and more general focus
have recently begun to attune their attention on natural resources as the
exploitation of the same heightens (Personal interview with Mohammed
Brahim (pseudonym), El Aaiún, August 25, 2014; Personal interview with
Mohammed Mayara, El Aaiún, August 27, 2014; Personal conversation with
Ali Salem Tamek, Auserd camp, December 12, 2015). Signiﬁcantly, the
leaders of both CSPRON and Saharawi League have suffered serious harass-
ment from the Moroccan authorities. Sidahmed Lemjayed, President of
CSPRON, was sentenced to life imprisonment for his involvement in the
Gdeim Izik camp in a Moroccan show trial in 2013 (Human Rights Watch
2013). Sultana Khaya, Founder and President of Saharawi League, is, at the
time of writing, visiting a specialist hospital in Spain following serious
stomach injuries sustained during torture. She has previously lost an eye
during police torture (S. Khaya, pers. int., 26 November 2014). Other
members of Saharawi League were injured by police in March 2014 during
their peaceful protest against the Kosmos-Cairn oil exploration partnership
(Western Sahara Resource Watch 2014).
Outside of the Occupied Territories, Saharawi Natural Resource Watch
(OSRN), a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) set up in the state-in-exile
in April 2013, and another NGO known as SCAP also initiated in the camps in
March 2015, are able to work without the barrier of police repression. Since
OSRN and SCAP have begun operating, there has been a large increase in pro-
tests, in the camps, against speciﬁc multinationals and governments involved in
natural resource exploitation. Most notable was the October 2015 protest
against British/Irish energy company San Leon in Auserd camp, attended by
some 8000 Saharawis.8 Similarly, the POLISARIO has launched a diplomatic
war against would-be oil exploiters. As well as speaking out in the media
against the activities and engaging both the companies themselves and the
UN Security Council (Western Sahara Resource Watch 2013, 9), the government
of the Saharawi state-in-exile has begun its own programme of issuing Assur-
ance Agreements for oil companies to explore offshore blocks, which can be
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taken up when POLISARIO gains access to the territories currently occupied by
Morocco9 as well as onshore blocks in the liberated territories of Western
Sahara, already controlled by POLISARIO.10 Indeed, POLISARIO is well aware
that oil revenue could be an important source of income for a future Saharawi
state and has, in May 2014, adopted a Mining Code. Furthermore, as Stephan
and Mundy (2006, 31) have pointed out, by offering the same blocks that
Morocco has promised to other companies, the POLISARIO hopes to encourage
an international legal battle.
Current agreements between oil multinationals and the Moroccan state-
owned oil company the National Ofﬁce for Hydrocarbons and Mines
(ONHYM) stand to offer minimum economic beneﬁts for Saharawis.
Rather, energy companies risk adding political legitimacy and signiﬁcant
funding to Morocco’s occupation whilst simultaneously creating further bar-
riers to the UN’s peace process, showing complicity in the human rights
abuses against the Saharawi people and, should oil be found, depleting
the natural resources of the Saharawis, meaning that the latter would not
beneﬁt upon achieving independence. The Saharawis are increasingly
aware of these implications. Social movement scholars argue that the politi-
cal power of resistance movements is related to the latter’s ability to take
advantage of political opportunities and respond to political threats (Tilly
and Tarrow 2007). Saharawis have identiﬁed the growing exploitation of
natural resources as a political (and ever growing) threat to their struggle
for independence, and, thus, sovereignty over natural resources has
become a strategic target of their resistance. Through their protesting and
campaigning, Saharawis have illustrated that any oil exploration and extrac-
tion activities will be undertaken without their consent, against their express
wishes. Again, in the Occupied Territories, where, as we have seen, activists
are serving life sentences and have faced torture for their open resistance to
resource exploitation, Saharawis nevertheless bear the risks of declared,
public resistance, since they are aware of the need for their resistance to
be observed by foreign companies.
Why are natural resources coming to the fore only now?
As I have illustrated above, natural resources have been at the heart of
Western Sahara’s sufferings under both Spanish and Moroccan colonialism.
Nevertheless, it is only relatively recently that natural resources have started
to re-surface and once again feature as a key demand in the protests of Sahar-
awi activists as they had in the Spanish period. As we have seen, the Saharawi
resistance movement in the Moroccan-occupied Territories has evolved over
time, focusing ﬁrst on human rights and socio-economic complaints
(although the nationalist question was always raised in clandestine actions)
and, as fear eroded in the second intifada, latterly on independence. Now,
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the demands of activists are widening even further, and natural resources are
coming to the fore. In the words of Malainin Lakhal,
The peaceful resistance has always progressed little by little in accordance with
the possibilities offered, and with careful progress building on the past experi-
ence. Before, it was very dangerous to show one’s political views, so the activists
used social, economic and cultural claims to create an atmosphere of resistance
in the society. Now, I think that we are in a phase in which the struggle is on at all
levels, and intentionally. (M. Lakhal, pers. comm., 13 May 2014)
It has been argued by social movement scholars that international actors can
serve as useful allies for resistance activists (McAdam 1998, 257; Ghalea 2013,
259). In the Saharawi case, a greater interest amongst international solidarity
groups in natural resources has also sparked parallel raised awareness
amongst Saharawi activists (M. Mayara, pers. int., 27 August 2014). As one Sahar-
awi woman explained, ‘we just didn’t know about the plunder until very
recently, so we have only just started to focus on it’ (Zahra Taleb (pseudonym),
personal conversations, Boujdour camp, 9 December 2015). When it comes to
investigating the natural resource exploitation activities of foreign companies,
activists based in the global North are often in a privileged position vis-à-vis
Saharawis living in the Occupied Territories for several reasons. First, when com-
panies and foreign governments publish information about their planned
activities in Western Sahara they tend to do so in English, a language spoken
by few Saharawi residents of the Occupied Territories. Second, reliable access
to the internet is also enjoyed by Northern solidarity groups to a much
greater extent than for the Saharawis. Third, lobbying against a national
company or government is facilitated if one is a resident and/or citizen of the
nation in question: the company and its shareholders can be visited, and
one’s representative in parliament can be harnessed. Finally, international
groups do not face the violent repression of the Moroccan authorities, and
are more likely to have the material resources necessary for lobbying. For all
these reasons, the international solidarity movement was able to play a key
role in the ﬁrst ﬁght against oil company activity in Western Sahara.
In 2003, the Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara launched a
campaign against the involvement of Norwegian company TGS-Topec in con-
ducting seismic surveys in the Occupied Territories. Simultaneously, a solidar-
ity organisation in Holland began to pressure Dutch Fugro Group to halt its
own surveying activities in the region. Thanks to the campaign, TGS-Topec
suffered massive divestment and deserted its activities in Western Sahara.
Threatened with the same, Fugro too pulled out. The Dutch and Norwegian
groups then joined forces with Saharawi solidarity groups in 12 other
countries, which together launched a ﬁght against American Kerr-McGee.
The US company pulled out of Western Sahara, but not before responsible
investors (including the world’s largest public investment fund the Norwegian
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Petroleum fund) divested some $80 million over the affair (Western Sahara
Resource Watch 2013, 3).
As well as lobbying against companies and governments involved in the
plunder of Western Sahara, international solidarity groups such as WSRW
have held workshops with Saharawi activists from the Occupied Territories
and camps focusing on advocacy and campaigning. It is also signiﬁcant
that Saharawis and international groups such as WSRW enjoy a symbiotic
relationship. WSRW, whose International Coordinator is based in Belgium, sup-
ported by volunteer coordinators and members across Europe but also in the
Americas, Australasia and Africa, can keep Saharawis in the Occupied Terri-
tories and camps up-to-date about the activities of companies and govern-
ments of the home countries of its members whilst WSRW needs the
Saharawis’ videos, information and photographs, and the latter’s expertise
in non-violent direct action, to support its lobbying. Indeed, international acti-
vists are often monitored, detained and expelled when they attempt to visit
the Occupied Territories, heightening the extent to which they rely on part-
nerships with local Saharawi civil society groups and activists.
Educational (in)opportunity is another important factor in explaining why
natural resources have become foregrounded in the demands of Saharawi
activists relatively recently. Saharawi students lament the lack of opportunity
to study English (a language, as mentioned, important for following the activi-
ties of foreign companies via the internet) since the Moroccan education
system focuses on French. Discrimination against Saharawi students is
common, and, since there are no universities in Western Sahara, access to
higher education is not open to the less well off. Nevertheless, those Sahara-
wis that do manage to club together the funds to travel and live in Morocco
proper often do so with the national struggle in mind. Cheikh Khaya, Activist
with Saharawi League, states, ‘I chose Law and English in order to help my
people. Most students study law because it will help the cause’ (Khaya cited
in Allan 2015). Similarly, Ahmed Baba, a Ph.D. student in International Law
at the University of Marrakesh, explains,
The majority of Saharawi higher education students choose to focus on law. But
there is no background of scholarship in international law amongst our people.
We are the ﬁrst generation to do this. The previous generations were too busy
defending their land. The generation of the seventies and eighties was either
involved in the war or exiled to the camps. The nineties, after the war
stopped, was a time of assassinations and arrests, especially of those studying.
That’s why we have a gap in the education of those in the Occupied Territories.
(Baba cited in Allan 2015)
When activists such as Khaya and Baba return home, the university students
engage with their compatriots, showing how key parts of international law
could be used to support the arguments made in lobbying and advocacy
work. Students that have studied foreign languages help activists to create
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banners and slogans against foreign corporations in the latter’s own tongue
(Discussion groups… 2014).
The issue of hope is one more reason Saharawi activists have turned their
attention back to natural resources in recent years. At the time of writing, it
has been 24 years since the ceaseﬁre. UN-brokered talks between POLISARIO
and Morocco have offered no fruit. One Saharawi woman’s reason for attend-
ing a workshop focused on the natural resources dimension of the Western
Sahara conﬂict in the refugee camps is illuminating in this regard: ‘I can see
that the diplomatic path is going nowhere, and so some young people
want to go back to war. I don’t want war, and I see natural resources as
another possible path towards our independence’ (Taleb (pseud.), pers.
conv., 2 December 2015). A development in the diplomatic route, recent at
the time of writing, arguably underlines the logic and urgency of this
woman’s simultaneous rejection of war and exasperation at the UN process.
In March 2016, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visited the Saharawi
camps, and in a press conference there described the Moroccan presence
in Western Sahara as an ‘occupation’. This outraged Morocco, which, in
protest, ordered the expulsion of 84 MINURSO civilian staff members and
the closure of a military liaison ofﬁce. The UN complied, raising questions as
to whether or not MINURSO is now logistically capable of organising a refer-
endum and resulting in new threats by the POLISARIO of a return to war. After
all, it only agreed to the 1991 ceaseﬁre due to the UN-promised referendum
on self-determination with the option of independence.
Finally, the role of the internet is also an important one to raise when dis-
cussing the recent re-emergence of natural resources amongst Saharawi civi-
lian non-violent activists. It was only in 2001 and 2002 that Saharawis began to
have access to mobile phones and the internet in the Occupied Territories
(Breika, pers. int., 31 March 2014), access in the camps is intermittent, and acti-
vists still face issues such as surveillance, blocking and hacking by Moroccan
authorities (Brahim (pseud.), pers. int., August 25, 2014; Discussion groups…
2014). On the other hand, despite these barriers, from the time of Gdeim Izik
onwards the sharing of information regarding natural resource exploitation by
Saharawis via social media has become far more visible (Telephone interview
with Erik Hagen, former Chair and founding member of WSRW, 28 February
2014). Mohammed Saleh, one of the founders of SCAP, based in the Saharawi
state-in-exile, puts it well when he refers to how social media can help Sahar-
awis overcome the Moroccan-imposed media blockade (foreign journalists
have a hard time entering occupied Western Sahara): ‘Social media is an
open space. Its success as a strategy depends on the Saharawis themselves.
You can no longer say that we don’t have media coverage’ (pers. conv. with
Mohammed Saleh, 9 December 2015). On the one hand, social media facili-
tates awareness-raising amongst Saharawis themselves regarding which com-
panies are exploiting Western Sahara’s resources and the implications of this
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exploitation. On the other hand, it is also a platform, as Saleh indicates, for
sharing Saharawis’ indignation at the exploitation internationally. Films and
photographs of Saharawis demonstrating against resource exploitation are
shared publicly with the concerned companies on Twitter and open letters
penned in English by Saharawis to said companies are shared on blogs and
webpages. Most recently, Saharawi Activist Senia Bachir Abderahman has
highlighted the issue of natural resource exploitation in a Western Sahara
edition of Al Jazeera’s social media-focused programme The Stream.11
What are the implications of the resource-turn in Saharawi
resistance?
In the light of French oil giant Total’s plans to begin searching for oil off
Western Sahara’s coast in 2001, the UN issued a legal opinion on the
matter. Hans Corell, who was then the UN’s Under-Secretary General for
Legal Affairs, concluded that
if further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of
the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in vio-
lation of the international law principles applicable to mineral resource activities
in Non-Self-Governing Territories. (Corell 2002)
The international law principles to which he refers include Article 73 of the
United Nations Charter and several General Assembly resolutions relating to
the questions of the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Corell 2010, 276–277).
These resolutions are designed ‘to protect the “inalienable rights” of the
peoples of [non-self-governing] territories to their natural resources, and to
establish and maintain control over the future development of those
resources’ and recognise ‘the need to protect the peoples of Non-Self-Govern-
ing Territories from exploitation and plundering by foreign economic inter-
ests’ (Corell 2010, 277). In early 2015, Corell declared that Kosmos’ activities
were in no way in line with his legal opinion (Corell 2015). Later that year,
in October 2015, the African Union (AU) published its own legal opinion,
stating in no uncertain terms that any company, state or group of states
exploring or exploiting natural resources do so in violation of international
law, and calling for an Africa-wide boycott of such companies, states and
groups of states (The Ofﬁce of the Legal Counsel and Directorate for Legal
Affairs of the African Union Commission 2015).
At the time of writing, none of the energy companies that have made
agreements with ONHYM to access the six blocks offshore Western Sahara
have published any evidence of how they have obtained the consent of the
Saharawi people to carry out exploration activities. Yet Saharawis continue
to take to the streets to passionately protest against such activities. In other
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words, since oil companies have decided not to consult them,12 Saharawis
have taken the initiative and illustrated, in no uncertain terms, that foreign
corporations purchasing licenses for oil exploration from the Moroccan gov-
ernment do so against their wishes.
Saharawis are also combining their demonstrations and lobbying with
legal action. POLISARIO won a case against the European Union (EU) in
December 2015 in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
annulled an EU-Morocco Trade Agreement insofar as it applies to the territory
of Western Sahara (the EU has appealed). A week later, oil company Total gave
up its block in Western Sahara. The case is a pioneering legal success for the
wider Saharawi struggle, and established that the POLISARIO has legal stand-
ing in the CJEU (the EU attempted to argue that it should not). The case will be
followed by two further cases in the same court, one involving POLISARIO
against the EU regarding a ﬁsheries agreement that allows European
vessels to ﬁsh in Western Sahara’s waters (Allan 2013, Sahara Press Service
2014), and another from Western Sahara Campaign (WSC), a group of
British solidarity activists, against the British government regarding the mis-
leading labelling of products from Western Sahara as Moroccan. It would be
unsurprising if members of the oil industry are targeted next. Until now,
foreign companies and the likes of the EU have managed to side-step inter-
national law on exploiting the resources of an occupied country. The recent
Court decision, should the appeal fail, implies this could be about to change.
The second implication of the pending oil exploration activities is potentially
more deadly. At the start of a documentary on Gdeim Izik by the Spanish soli-
darity group Sahara Thawra, a Saharawi activist can be seen spraying grafﬁti ‘the
loss of all hope will make us free’ on to a wall (Sahara Thawra 2012). Almost 40
years after the Moroccan invasion, Saharawis have long lost hope in Spain, in
the UN and in the global powers, and gradually their hope in international
civil society and international law is fading too. For some, war is the only
option for freedom now that the hope of all other avenues has faded. A
return to armed war is gaining popularity amongst the youth of the refugee
camps. ‘The pressure to return to war is becoming almost unbearable’ said
Mohammed Abdelaziz, President of the SADR, in an interview (McTighe
2013). In the Occupied Territories too, the pressure is mounting. The violent
clashes between Saharawis andMoroccan authorities following the dismantling
of Gdeim Izik camp, which resulted in several deaths, are indicative of this
change in mentality, especially since the Saharawi resistance movement up
to this point had been non-violent. The young, jobless Saharawis, without rea-
listic aspirations and under the weight of constant repression often describe
themselves as ‘buried alive’, or, as Hamza Lakhal tells it, ‘lots of people have
big dreams here. But they can’t achieve them because they are Saharawi’ (Per-
sonal conversations with Hamza Lakhal, El Aaiún, August 2014). More and more
are in favour of war. Says Khawla Khaya, soon to complete her studies in Rabat
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and with no prospects of a job back home, ‘I’ll be the ﬁrst in line to sign up to
ﬁght’ (Khaya quoted in Allan 2015).
Conclusions
Under Spanish rule, the emerging discourses of the POLISARIO gave rise to a
Saharawi national identity, and within these discourses, natural resources,
above all phosphates, become a symbol of colonised nationhood, a claim to
be staked by the new and fast-growing Saharawi independence movement.
Nevertheless, the Moroccan invasion in 1975 and subsequent repressive occu-
pation of the resource-rich portion of Western Sahara pushed the resistance of
the remaining Saharawi civilians underground. The activists relied on what
Scott has called ‘the weapons of the weak’, that is, covert and everyday acts
of resistance, for over a decade. It was not until an important external actor,
the UN, visited the territory in 1987 that activists took the strategic decision
to storm the public stage with an open and mass protest. Although this dem-
onstration was harshly repressed, over the following decades open resistance
continued, and with each intifada, new claims were pursued in line with the pol-
itical opportunities that activists perceived. Thus in 1999, whilst pro-indepen-
dence slogans were still seen as too risky and were largely tucked away until
2005, human rights and socio-economic demands were raised. By 2010, 35
years after the POLISARIO had ﬁrst made sovereignty over phosphates a key
demand for the pro-independence movement, international allies had begun
to work with Saharawis on the issue of natural resource exploitation with
some signiﬁcant successes encouraging the divestment of Big Oil. Natural
resources became the key claim of the Gdeim Izik, the largest protest ever
seen in Western Sahara. This outright contradicts the empty claims of oil com-
panies that they have sought the consent of the Saharawi population to go
ahead with their exploration and exploitation. The ramiﬁcations of this are
not just legal (international law prohibits the exploitation of the resources of
a territory under occupation unless its people consent) but deadly: whilst
natural resource exploitation widens and deepens, calls amongst the Saharawi
population to return to war grow. If the likes of Cairn, Kosmos and San Leon
strike commercial quantities of oil in the coming months, it will have cata-
strophic consequences for the Saharawi independence activists. Time will tell
if this will push the angry youth over the edge.
Notes
1. The ﬁrst fortiﬁed settlement at Villa Cisneros intended to sell clothes, food, arms,
mirrors, steel bars, donkeys and horses to the local nomads, whilst buying from
them camels, gazelle furs, gold, Arabic gum and ostrich feathers, but trade never
took off due to repeated Saharawi raids against the Spanish.
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2. The ﬁrst UN General Assembly Resolution on the matter was number 2229 (XXI)
in December 1966, which called for Spain to grant self-determination to the
‘peoples relating to the territories of Sidi Ifni and Spanish Sahara’.
3. For an analysis of the 1992 Intifada of three cities, see Barona Castañeda 1
January (2015)
4. Originally quoted as ‘Ahel essahra daau daau welkhaira ¯t illa yenba ¯‘u’ (The
Sahrawi people suffers while its wealth is looted) by Alice Wilson from a video
of protests ﬁlmed by Sahara Thawra. (Wilson 2013, 88).
5. Saharawis charged with organising the camp argue that the camp arose in a
largely organic and non-hierarchical fashion, although youth activists took a
leading role in administering all aspects of the camp, and organised committees
for this purpose, once it emerged.
6. Ali Salem Tamek, one of the unofﬁcial leaders of the resistance in the Occupied
Territories, also asserts that natural resources were at the heart of the Gdeim Izik
protests, as did participants of the discussion groups in Agadir (22 April 2014)
and Marrakech (23 April 2014). Personal conversation with Ali Salem Tamek,
Auserd camp, Algeria, 12 December 2015.
7. See www.wsrw.org for a few examples.
8. Footage of the protest can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
mChmF9tzHag. Last accessed 4 January 2016.
9. See the SADR’s oil and gas webpage for more information: http://www.
sadroilandgas.com.
10. For more on this programme of agreements, see Kamal (2015)
11. Watch the programme here: http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201511250121-
0025099. Last accessed 13 January 2015.
12. Kosmos has published a Position Paper in which it claims to have consulted with
‘the people of the territory’ through a Moroccan partner. However, according to
all Saharawi grassroots organisations mentioned in this paper, only Moroccan
settlers have been consulted despite the Saharawis’ restless if unsuccessful
attempts to contact Kosmos and be included in the consultation process.
Cairn has made no attempt to consult with Saharawis and has failed to
respond to letters and requests for meetings from Saharawi civil society organ-
isations and British Members of Parliament.
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